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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
incorporation, to be paid in before the corporation was to commence
business.8 5 Nevertheless, statutes of this type offer some protection
to third parties who have dealt with such corporations. In addition
to this protection, an awareness of this problem by persons who deal
with corporations and inquiry by them as to the financial condition
of such corporations should do much to protect third parties in this
situation.
WILLIAm L. STOCKS
C6rporations-Restricted Stock Transfers-First Options Consequent
Upon the Death of Shareholder
In the recent case of Globe Slicing Mach. Co. v. Hasner,1 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a bylaw2 pro-
hibiting the sale or disposition of the capital stock by a shareholder
without first offering the same to the corporation or remaining
shareholders was inapplicable to a transfer consequent upon the
death of a shareholder and effected pursuant to the shareholder's
will. The court, interpreting the bylaw provisions under the New
York policy of construing first option restraints narrowly, stated:
"First option provisions in order effectively to restrain dispositions
by will must specifically so provide. This was not done here."8
The question now arises whether or not a narrow construction
of such bylaw restrictions is justifiable in view of the reasons for
their existence.' The usual purpose of such restrictions is to main-
' See note 34 supra. But see S.C. CODE § 12-14.6(b) (Supp. 1964),
which provides:
If a corporation has transacted any business in violation of this sec-
tion, any person (whether a promoter, incorporator, shareholder,
subscriber, or director) who has participated therein, shall be joint-
ly and severally liable for the debts or liabilities of the corporation
arising therefrom.
1333 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1964).
' No sale or disposition of any shares of the capital stock of this
corporation by any stockholder shall be valid unless and until he
shall give notice in writing of such intention to the corporation, and
to all the present stockholders of the company . . . whereupon the
company and all of said stockholders shall jointly and/or severally
have the option and right to purchase the same within thirty days
after receiving such notice ....
Id. at 414.
3Id. at 415.
'In the management of corporations few things are more apparent
than the desire to keep the control in the same hands of people
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tain harmonious control within the corporation. This question be-
comes especially acute in the case of a close corporation,5 where the
members or shareholders are working as an incorporated partner-
ship.' The prime objective of the close corporation is to remain
close by being able to choose new "partners" in the event of retire-
ment or death of a present shareholder.7
In general, the validity of reasonable restrictions' upon the
transfer of stock of a corporation where they are imposed by the
who are congenial to the enterprise and to those who manage its
affairs. A quarreling directorate is a misfortune to the stock-
holders of any corporation. When such situations occur, as they
often do, there is no objection to the purchase by the corporation of
the shares of the disgruntled stockholders and the resale to those
more in harmony with the enterprise. In the organization of corpo-
rations it is frequently provided in the articles or bylaws that a
stockholder shall not sell his stock without first giving a stated
period with which the corporation or other stockholders may have
an opportunity to purchase. I find nothing in all this against public
policy. On the contrary, it has to do solely with common sense and
practical business.
Moses v. Soule, 63 Misc. 203, 209, 118 N.Y. Supp. 410, 414 (Sup. Ct.),
affd, 136 App. Div. 904, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1136 (1909).
'A close corporation is an enterprise in corporate form in which the
management and ownership are substantially identical and the identity re-
sults almost in a partnership. See Israel, The Close Corporation and the
Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948).
6 Ibid.
' Mr. Chief Justice Holmes stated that "Stock in a corporation is not
merely property. It also creates a personal relation analogous otherwise
than technically to a partnership. . . . [T]here seems to be no greater
objection to retaining the right of choosing one's associates in a corpora-
tion than in a firm." Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934,
935 (1902).
'In Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N.E. 521 (1929),
the court stated, as to the validity of stock restrictions, "Restrictions on
the sale of shares of stock in a corporation are valid and binding.... No
restrictions can be declared void, unless palpably unreasonable." Id. at 110,
168 N.E. at 525. And the court in First Nat'l Bank v. Shanks, 34 Ohio
Op. 359, 73 N.E.2d 93 (C.P. 1945), observed "that in practically all of
the cases where restrictions have been invalid, the courts have based their
judgments on the fact that the restriction was a permanent prohibition."
Id. at 360, 73 N.E.2d at 95. Examples of the types of restrictions which
have been upheld are: (1) consent restraints, requiring the approval of
transfers by shareholders or directors or both, (2) first option provisions
granting the corporation or other shareholders a pre-emptive right to shares
the holder decides to sell or transfer, (3) buy and sell arrangements for
the transfer of a deceased holder's shares to the corporation or to other
shareholders at a stipulated price or valuation determined by formula, and
(4) provisions limiting the transfer to a specific class of persons. See 2
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAcTICE §§ 7.05-.14 (1958).
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charter or articles of incorporation, 9 or by the bylaws,10 has been
upheld: provided, however, the certificate itself complies with sec-
tion 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.1 ' But first option sale
or transfer restraints have been held not to apply to a sale between
shareholders,' 2 to a sale by a receiver pursuant to a court order,"3
nor to a sheriff's sale on execution against a shareholder. 4 Al-
though it would appear that these provisions have been interpreted
rather restrictively, the corporation would in all probability remain
status quo ante with regard to control and management of its affairs
on a sale to a shareholder, if the shareholder acted in good faith
and in the interest of the corporation. 5 This would also be true on
a sale by a sheriff or receiver, since the corporation could repur-
chase the stock by becoming the highest bidder at the sheriff's or
receiver's sale.'" But the corporation is not always able to repurchase
the shares where the shareholder dies and bequeaths his stock to a
legatee who would, in all likelihood, have no interest in the affairs
of the corporation; that is, where the legatee would be an "out-
sider" to the corporation.
Where the restrictive provisions expressly provided that on the
death of a shareholder his stock would automatically become the
'Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N.Y. Supp. 873
(Sup. Ct. 1919).10 Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930).
"
1 UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER AcT § 15 provides:
There shall be no lien in favor of a corporation upon the shares
represented by a certificate issued by such corporation and there
shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so represented
by virtue of any bylaws of such corporation, or otherwise, unless
the right of the corporation to such lien or the restriction is stated
upon the certificate.
Section 15 is in force in nearly all states. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-89
(1960).
"
2 Gibbon v. 3920 Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 310 Ill. App. 385, 34
N.E.2d 109 (1941); Rychwalski v. Baranowski, 205 Wis. 193, 236 N.W.
131 (1931). Contra, Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 149
N.W. 754 (1914).1 In re Trilling & Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ; Mc-
Donald v. Farley & Loetscher Mfg. Co., 226 Iowa 53, 283 N.W. 261 (1939).1, Barrows v. National Rubber Co., 12 R.I. 173 (1878).1 9A stockholder may purchase the shares in order to become the majority
stockholder with the sole intention of "freezing out" the minority stock-
holders. Such action by the stockholder would, in all likelihood, be un-
beneficial to the corporation. For a discussion of majority transactions
which "freeze out" the minority, see 35 N.C.L. REv. 271 (1957).1 In re Trilling & Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Bar-
rows v. National Rubber Co., 12 R.I. 173 (1878).
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property of the corporation,'7 or that the corporation or remaining
shareholders would have the right to purchase the shares,"8 the
courts have consistently held such restrictions valid and binding
upon the executor of the deceased shareholder. 9 These provisions
have been held valid both on the ground that they were reasonable,
in view of the particular corporation, " and on the ground that
they were not testamentary in character and thus not void for fail-
ure to comply with the formal requirements of statutes governing
wills.2
On the other hand, when the provisions did not specifically pro-
vide for the death of a shareholder, as in Globe Slicing Mach. Co.,
the courts generally have held that the provisions are inapplicable
to a transfer consequent upon the death of the shareholder.2 2 This
"' In Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.2d 207 (1938), the
bylaw provided that the stock "shall automatically become the property of
the corporation by paying to the estate of the deceased a sum agreed upon
by the remaining stockholders." Id. at 347, 15 N.E.2d at 208.
"Schaffer v. Below, 174 F. Supp. 505 (D. V.I. 1959); Oakland Scav-
enger Co. v. Gandi, 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 124 P.2d 143 (1942); Allen v.
Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1957); First Nat'l Bank v. Coldwell, 286 App. Div. 1079, 145 N.Y.S.2d
674 (1955) (agreement between shareholder and corporation); In re
Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963); Covey v. Covey's
Little Am., Inc. 378 P.2d 506 (Wyo. 1963).
"o The executor must first offer the shares to the remaining shareholders
or to the corporation, or otherwise, pursuant to the terms of the provision,
before he may distribute to the designated legatees. This raises a collateral
problem; that is, how does the corporation afford the price of transfer?
In most states the corporation may only repurchase its shares out of sur-
plus. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55- 52 (c) (Supp. 1963). This generally
means that the corporation must establish a sinking fund if their surplus
is small. The method recognized as being most advantageous to the corpora-
tion is the taking out of business insurance on the shareholder's life. Cf.
Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940). In
North Carolina, insurance taken out by a corporation is regulated by statute
and provides that it may only be taken out on the life of an officer or
employee of the corporation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b)(4) (1960); see
note 42 infra. But since shareholders in a close corporation are usually
either officers or employees, insurance is still a workable method for paying
the transfer price of the shares. See generally 2 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 7.25-.28 (1958).
"Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 161
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
"
1Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N.E.
648 (1917) (shareholders' agreement); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Manufactures
Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 406, 39 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1943) (agreement between
two shareholders).
"Stern v. Stern, 146 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Elson v. Security
State Bank, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.W.2d 525 (1954); Taylor's Adm'r v.
Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957); Kentucky Package Store, Inc. v.
Checani, 331 Mass. 125, 117 N.E.2d 139 (1954) ; Lane v. Albertson, 78 App.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
conclusion is most often reached by way of either a strict construc-
tion 23 or by holding that the provisions were inapplicable at the
time of the shareholder's death, since transmission or devolution
of the shares was inevitable. 24 In either case, the resolution is con-
gruent and indifferentiable, since the holdings mean that the re-
strictions only allude to a voluntary sale or transfer and not to one
caused by operation of law.25 Extrapolation by the courts has not
been evident,26 and their failure to examine the intent of the pro-
visions and the reasons for their existence have led to cursory
interpretations. This in turn has opened the door for the entrance
of many legatees into the corporate affairs, sometimes causing dis-
harmony 7 or liquidation. The provisions were designed and in-
serted to prevent precisely these contingencies.
The plain objectives of the bylaw provisions require an inter-
pretation that imposes the restrictions on the stock in the hands of
the executor notwithstanding the failure to use express, all inclu-
sive, and limiting language.2" Similar provisions, which did not pro-
vide for the obvious eventuality of death, have been interpreted as
being applicable to the shares at the death of the shareholder and
binding upon the executor.2" The court in Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of Am. Red Cross,"0 in
very persuasive language, said:
Div. 607, 79 N.Y. Supp. 947 (1903). Cf. Vogel v. Melish, 46 Ill. App. 2d
465, 196 N.E.2d 402 (1964); Storer v. Ripley, 12 Misc. 2d 622, 178
N.Y.S.2d 7 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
" In Taylor's Adm'r v. Taylor, 301 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1957), the court
stated, "The terms of the bylaw . . . seem to be limited to a voluntary
sale, although 'transfer' and 'sale' are stated as alternatives. The use of
the word 'transfer' looks to a sale and has no natural application to any
other disposition." Id. at 583. Compare BALLINTINE, CoRPoRATioNs § 321
(rev. ed. 1946); UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER AcT §§ 1, 22.
"Stern v. Stem, 146 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Elson v. Security
State Bank, 246 Iowa 601, 67 N.W.2d 525 (1954).
5 See notes 23 & 24 supra.
"' See note 22 supra.
27 One source of disharmony would be the legatee's failure to consent
to an election made by the corporation pursuant to subchapter S of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 dealing with election of certain small business
corporations to their taxable status. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1372.
" Mathews v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.Y. 1964). This
case exemplifies the interrelated problem of evaluation of the shares for the
purpose of gift and estate taxation.
2" Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of
Am. Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953); Garrett v. Phila-
delphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909).
" Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of
Am. Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953).
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The executors are the present holders and can make the required
transfers. Their title to the stock, although it was specifically
bequeathed, vested in them upon their appointment..... It passed
to them by operation of the law notwithstanding the restrictions.
... Although they hold the stock in the right of another rather
than in their own right... their power to transfer is not there-
by enlarged .... They have no greater rights in the stock than
did the testatrix and they hold the shares subject to the same
restrictions on the transfer which were in effect at the time of
her death .... [T]he executors are ... bound by the conditions
under which the stock was issued and by the contract of their
testatrix 3 l
The court in this case proceeded on the theory that the provisions
represented a valid contract3e 2 between the testatrix and the cor-
poration. Many courts3 have proceeded on the basis that a bylaw
is a contract between the shareholder and the corporation and have
gone so far as to hold that an invalid bylaw can still be a valid
contract as between the shareholder and the corporation. 4 On con-
tract and plain objective theory, one court3 5 has taken issue with
1 Id. at 117, 111 N.E.2d at 449.
12 The English courts rely almost exclusively on the theory of contract,
and, hence, more extensive corporate restrictions on the transfer of stock
is allowed. For example, in It re Smith & Fawcett Ltd., [1942] 1 Ch. 304,
Lord Greene, M.R., in upholding a provision which in part provided, "the
directors may at any time in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion
refuse to register any transfer of shares," stated:
Private Companies are in law separate entities just as much as are
public companies, but from the business and personal point of view
they are much more analogous to partnerships than to public corpo-
rations. Accordingly, it is to be expected that in the articles of such
a company the control of the directors over the membership may be
very strict indeed.
Id. at 306. A private company is a company which: by its articles restricts
the right to transfer its shares; limits the number of members to fifty, not
including employees and former employees, and where two or more hold
one or more shares jointly, they are a single member; prohibits any invita-
tion to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of the company.
Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 28, 455(1). See generally
6 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND § 526 (3d ed. 1954).
"'E.g., Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Casady v.
Modern Metal Spinning & Mfg. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10 Cal. Rep. 790
(1964); Evans v. Dennis, 203 Ga. 232, 46 S.E.2d 122 (1948); Bechtold
v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951) (where the
contract theory received its ultimate exposition); Garrett v. Philadelphia
Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909).
" New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894);
Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Borrowe, 71 N.H. 69, 51 Atl. 670 (1901).
'Mathew v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.Y. 1964).
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the "canon of interpretation that requires expansive clarity of ex-
pression"" in the bylaws to achieve the desired ends and stated:
[T]he presence or absence in the contract of the words like
"executors and assigns" or of expressions to the effect that the
contract is to bind the executors and estate of each party, do
not operate, ex proprio vigore, to make the contract "binding" on
the executors after the contracting party's death (for it binds
them without those words) ... .7
Thus, the court in disregarding the narrow interpretation has given
effect and vitality to the desired ends and plain objectives of the
bylaw provisions.
In North Carolina, no cases have arisen that finally determine
this issue. In fact, only one case has reached the supreme court
concerning restrictions on the transfer of stock."8 In that case, the
court adopted a liberal position as to "consent"3 " restrictions and
held such a restriction valid and not contrary to public policy. The
legislature, in the 1955 North Carolina Business Corporation Act,40
has provided that a corporation may, if it so desires, place certain
restrictions upon the transfer of its stock.4 ' The act also provides
86 Id. at 1007.
.7 Id. at 1006.
88 Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744 (1921).
89A "consent" restriction is generally one in which the directors, officers
or shareholders of the corporation must consent to a proposed sale or
transfer by a shareholder of his stock. This type of restriction is the most
advantageous to the corporation, since it does not have to expend any of
its surplus or take out business insurance on the shareholders as in a first
option or buy and sell arrangement. The consent restriction is also the
most disfavored by the courts because it is usually highly arbitrary in its
effectuation. See Finch v. Macoupin Tel. & Tel. Co., 146 Ill. App. 158
(1908); Miller v. Farmers Mill & Elevator Co., 78 Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 995
(1907), where it was held to be an unreasonable restraint. See generally
O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65, HARV. L. REv. 773 (1952).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to -175 (1960).
'
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(c) (1960), provides:
The bylaws may contain any provisions for the regulation and man-
agement of the affairs of the corporation, including the transfer of
its shares, and restrictions on such transfer, not inconsistent with
the law or the charter.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c) (Supp. 1963), provides:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (e) and (f) of this section,
a corporation may, by the action of its board of directors, purchase
and pay for its shares, but only out of surplus and only in the fol-
lowing cases: ....
(4) From any shareholder in the exercise of the corporation's
right to purchase the shares pursuant to restrictions upon the trans-
fer thereof.
[Vol. 43
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a very healthy climate for the close corporation.4 2 The climate in-
cludes provisions for business insurance on an employee's life,48
which is the general method by which the corporation is enabled
to finance repurchase of the deceased shareholder's stock.44 In view
of its liberal position on the "consent" restriction and the favor-
itism shown the close corporation by the legislature, it would seem
anomalous for the court to interpret narrowly a bylaw provision
restricting the "sale or transfer" of shares of stock merely because
there was no provision for the obvious eventuality of death.
It is submitted that the court in Globe Slicing Mach. Co. was
unjustified in its narrow construction of the bylaw provision.4 5 In
view of the reasons for their existence, the broad language seemed
quite sufficient to bind the executor and to prohibit from entering
the corporate affairs those legatees who could bring disharmony to
Subsections (e) and (f) provide generally that the corporation cannot
purchase or redeem its shares if the corporation is unable to meet its obli-
gations as they become due in the ordinary course of business, liabilities
would exceed the assets, there is an unpaid accrued dividend on shares
entitled to preferential dividends ahead of shares to be purchased, etc. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-52(e), (f) (1960).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1960), provides:
Except in cases where the shares of the corporation are at the time
or subsequently become generally traded in the markets maintained
by securities dealers or brokers, no written agreement to which all
of the shareholders have actually assented, whether embodied in
the charter or bylaws or in any side agreement in writing and
signed by all the parties thereto, and which relates to any phase
of the affairs of the corporation, whether to the management of its
business or division of its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as
between the parties thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt by
the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partner-
ship or to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be
appropriate only between partners.
For a discussion of this section and the close corporation, see Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act,
34 N.C.L. Rnv. 432, 438 (1956).
"8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b) (4) (1960), provides:
In connection with carrying out the purposes stated in its charter
... every corporation shall also have power: ....
(4) To procure for its benefit insurance on the life of any em-
ployee, including any officer, whose death might cause financial
loss to the corporation, and to this end the corporation is deemed to
have an insurable interest in its employees and officers.
"See text accompanying note 19 supra.
'"In this diversity case, the court was compelled to follow the New
York law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In so
doing, they relied primarily on Lane v. Albertson, 78 App. Div. 607, 79
N.Y. Supp. 947 (1903), which was similar in many respects to the present
case. But query whether that case established, as a matter of law, the policy
of narrow construction of bylaw provisions in New York.
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the close corporation and frustrate its continuance. While it is diffi-
cult to understand the objectives achieved by the decision, it is in
accord with the weight of authority.4 It further demonstrates the
necessity of providing for every possible contingency which might
adversely affect the affairs of the corporation in a sale or transfer
of its shares of stock.' 7
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Labor Law-Secondary Consumer Boycotts, Picketing, and
Publicity-The Landrum-Griffin Amendment to the Labor
Management Relations Act
In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has ex-
amined statutory restrictions on secondary boycott activity and, for
the first time, the extension of these restrictions in the labor reform
legislation of 1959. The Court held in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers' that Congress did not intend that the 1959 Landrum-Grif-
fin amendments2 to section 8(b) (4) of the Labor Management
" See note 22 supra.
" The need for providing for every contingency is shown in Albert E.
Touchet, Inc. v. Thompson, 259 Mass. 220, 156 N.E. 41 (1927), where
the court held that even though the bylaw of the corporation was binding
-on the shareholder, his executor, administrator, or assignee to offer the
stock for appraisal with rights to purchase it in the corporation, it was
,not binding on the deceased shareholder's special administrator, since the
special administrator had not been provided for in the bylaw. But see
Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 198 Okla. 667, 181 P.2d 1007 (1947),
where the court in effect held that restrictions are usually construed to
permit the widest range under the language used.
1377 U.S. 58 (1964).
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in any industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course
of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodi-
ties or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
[Vol. 43
